Too Big To Fail -- Dodd-Frank and Sorkin

I've just finished reading Andrew Ross Sorkin's excellent book Too Big To Fail (Penguin, 2009).  If you haven't read it yet, put it on your list, because this one is really worth it.  The book tells the gripping tale of the financial crisis, beginning with the downward slide of Bear Stearns and Lehman and continuing through to adoption of the TARP program.   With particular focus on Tim Geithner, then President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Hank Paulson, then Secretary of the Treasury, who - along with many others in government and the private sector - worked tirelessly to try to fix a seemingly unending parade of problems, Sorkin captures the intensity of the times and offers insights into why things happened the way they did.   It's a real page-turner, and suprisingly so given that the primary elements of the story are already well known.

As we now try to figure out how to deal with the Dodd-Frank Act (pdf) and its potential impact on financial institutions, it's helpful to look back at what happened in 2008, as described in Sorkin's book.  It's striking to see how similar certain provisions of the Act (and the language used in the congressional committee's report about the Act) are to the ideas expressed by people in government during the crisis itself. 

In particular, concerns about moral hazard (the idea that undue risk-taking is promoted when managers and shareholders know they can be insulated from negative consequences) and about the real need for an alternative to the bankruptcy process for large financial institutions, were often voiced.  As quoted in Sorkin's book, both Paulson and Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, expressed on multiple occasions the need for the government to have authority to resolve or wind-down complex financial institutions outside of bankruptcy.  Bernanke also spoke of the need to mitigate moral hazard  "by allowing the government to resolve failing firms in a way that is orderly but also wipes out equity holders and haircuts some creditors."

And sure enough, in adopting Dodd-Frank, Congress explained that the "too big to fail" provisions address both of these issues front and center.  The Act provides for "orderly liquidation authority" if the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation with the President,  and with the wrritten recommendation of two additional  federal regulators) finds that liquidation is necessary to mitigate "serious adverse effects on financial stability" in the nation.  The liquidation is to be carried out in a manner that "minimizes moral hazard," with costs being borne first by shareholders and unsecured creditors -- and protecting taxpayers from these losses.

Several other provisions of Dodd-Frank can find their beginnings in the events of 2008 as well --  short sales, hedge fund regulation, derivatives, rating agencies, etc.  Turns out that Sorkin's book, though likely not intended for this purpose, provides a fascinating background story and explanation for much of the content of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Jury Trial Waivers - California is Just Different

I live in California, which (among many other things) is a state known for having some unusual laws.  One oddity that comes up from time to time when negotiating loans is the fact that jury trial waivers - which are standard in most corporate loan agreements - are generally unenforceable in California. 

This is old news to several of you, I know, but I received some questions about this recently, so I thought it might be helpful to offer up an explanation.  In a nutshell, what this means for you is that if your borrower is located in California, if California law is the governing law for your loan agreement, or, if neither of those things is true, but there is nonetheless some possibility that you could end up in a California court, you may want to choose an alternative to a straight-up jury trial waiver provision (unless, of course, you actually want a jury . . . ).

Back when this became law in California (because of the decision in Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (pdf), where the California Supreme Court determined that pre-dispute jury trial waivers violate the state's constitution) there was initially some confusion as to how best to get around the prohibition on these kinds of waivers.  But now, there are well-established practices for what to do.

Many lenders in California have chosen to use judicial reference provisions in their loan agreements.  Judicial reference is generally accepted as a valid alternative to jury trial waivers, using the Grafton case analysis (as is arbitration, under many circumstances).  Judicial reference is a special process established in the California Code of Civil Procedure (Section 638, et seq.), and, as a practical matter, it can be rather similar to arbitration.  It gets you out of the regular courtroom and into separate proceedings that don't involve a jury, where the case can be decided by a referee chosen by the parties.  The general rules for judicial reference are provided for directly in the California statute. 

Here's one example of how some lenders have added judicial reference to the waiver provisions in a loan agreement (there are certainly more complicated ways to do this too):

 To the extent the foregoing waiver of a jury trial is held to be unenforceable under applicable California law, the parties hereby agree to refer, for a complete and final adjudication, any and all issues of fact or law involved in any litigation or proceeding (including but not limited to all discovery and law and motion matters, pretrial motions, trial matters and post-trial motions), brought to resolve any dispute between the parties hereto (whether based on contract, tort or otherwise) arising out of or otherwise related to this Agreement or any other Loan Document to a judicial referee who shall be appointed under a general reference pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 638, which referee's decision will stand as the decision of the court.  Such judgment will be entered on the referee’s statement of judgment in the same manner as if the action had been tried by the court.  The parties shall select a single neutral referee, [who shall be a retired state or federal judge] [with at least five years of judicial experience in civil matters]; provided that in the event the parties cannot agree upon a referee, the referee will be appointed by the court.